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Sexual Politics and Social Change 
DARREN LENARD HUTCHINSON 
The Article examines the impact of social movement activity upon the 
advancement of GLBT rights.  It analyzes the state and local strategy that 
GLBT social movements utilized to alter the legal status of sexual 
orientation and sexuality following the Supreme Court’s ruling in Bowers 
v. Hardwick.  Successful advocacy before state and local courts, human 
rights commissions, and legislatures fundamentally shifted public opinion 
and laws regarding sexual orientation and sexuality between Bowers and 
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Lawrence v. Texas.  This altered landscape 
created the “political opportunity” for the Lawrence ruling and made the 
opinion relatively “safe.”   
Currently, GLBT rights groups are following a similar strategy with 
respect to the pursuit of same-sex marriage.  This Article evaluates that 
strategy and considers whether political opportunities for reform in GLBT 
rights exist on the national stage. 
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Sexual Politics and Social Change 
DARREN LENARD HUTCHINSON∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Social movements are essential for the achievement of legal and 
political change.  A “social movement” is an organized and sustained 
political effort to alter the substance of policy and public opinion on 
matters of interest to the movement’s participants.1  In recent years, a 
growing body of scholarship among constitutional law scholars examines 
the relationship between social movement activity and the evolution of 
Supreme Court doctrine.  Reva Siegel, for example, connects changes in 
the Court’s treatment of sex-based discrimination to feminist organizing 
and shifting gender roles in the post-World War II era.2  And Michael 
Klarman has written extensive accounts on the relationship between the 
Civil Rights Movement, Southern backlash, and progressive changes in the 
status of blacks before the law.3   
The work of these scholars depicts Court doctrine in a much more 
complicated fashion than many traditional accounts, which contend that 
judicial review conflicts with democratic governance.4  Although Supreme 
Court justices are indeed unelected and have lifetime tenure, their rulings, 
particularly on matters of broad social concern, respond to Congress, the 
President and public opinion.5  Because social movements can impact the 
opinion of members of Congress, the President, the electorate, and 
individual judges, they can also indirectly and directly inform the 
                                                                                                                          
∗ Professor, American University, Washington College of Law. J.D. Yale Law School; B.A. 
University of Pennsylvania.  Editor, Dissenting Justice: http://dissentingjustice.blogspot.com. 
1 Darren Lenard Hutchinson, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Affirmative Action, Sodomy and 
Supreme Court Politics, 23 LAW & INEQ. 1, 73–74 (2005) (discussing social movements). 
2 See generally Reva Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional 
Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323 (2006). 
3 See, e.g., MICHAEL KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS (2004) (discussing limits on 
Supreme Court as an instrument of racial justice and linking most effective changes to politics and 
social movement actors). 
4 Hutchinson, supra note 1, at 5–12 (discussing antidemocracy critiques of judicial review). 
5 See generally Hutchinson, supra note 1, at 16 n.95 (listing numerous sources linking Supreme 
Court rulings with public opinion); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and 
Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 
1984–2004 (2003) (discussing Congressional impact on Court’s treatment of sex-based discrimination); 
Robert L. Tsai, Reconsidering Gobitis: An Exercise in Presidential Leadership, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 
363 (discussing presidential influence on judicial elaboration of constitutional norms). 
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perspectives of courts and reshape constitutional law.6  Consequently, 
social movements have an important role in doctrinal evolution. 
Social movements have lobbied for and effectuated political and 
doctrinal changes in the context of racial justice and gay, lesbian, bisexual 
and transgender (GLBT) rights.7  But to the extent that the public—or 
social movements themselves—embraces relatively moderate positions on 
matters related to race and sexuality, the Court will likely produce rulings 
that reflect a centrist perspective—even though the Court is often seen as a 
strong protector of disparaged social groups from majoritarian bias and 
maltreatment.8 
In Lawrence v. Texas, for example, the Court anchored its ruling 
around dominant public opinion concerning GLBT rights, even as it 
reversed Bowers v. Hardwick, which reflected pernicious stereotypes of 
and distaste for same-sex intimacy.9  For example, the Court justified its 
decision to invalidate the state’s antisodomy statute in part because most 
states had decriminalized sodomy by court rulings or statutory repeal.10  
GLBT social movements played a central role in the decriminalization of 
sodomy because they litigated several of the state cases that overturned the 
statutes.11  GLBT rights groups also developed relationships with state 
legislators who, seeking support from organized political organizations, 
took liberal stances on GLBT rights.12  Thus, social movements influenced 
the outcome in Lawrence by engaging in political activity that 
fundamentally altered the legal status of GLBT individuals after Hardwick.   
My current research considers the prospect for legal change in the area 
of sexual orientation jurisprudence and legislation in the near future.  My 
interest in this topic reflects an ongoing appreciation of the impact of social 
and political factors upon Court doctrine.  It also responds to changes in 
the nation’s political landscape brought by the election of President Barack 
                                                                                                                          
6 See Siegel, supra note 2, at 1418 (“Over the course of American history, groups seeking 
constitutional change have worked to move one branch of federal or state government to dispute 
questions of constitutional meaning with another, in an effort to make dissenting constitutional claims 
audible, and ultimately, to secure for them the force of law.”). 
7 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and Public Law, 150 U. 
PA. L. REV. 419, 423–59 (2001) (discussing the role of law in fortifying social movement activity in 
antiracist, feminist, and gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender contexts). 
8 See Hutchinson, supra note 1, at 32–72 (discussing majoritarian influences on Court’s race and 
sexual orientation jurisprudence). 
9 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571–78 (2003), rev’g Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 
(1986).  
10 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573 (“The 25 states with laws prohibiting the relevant conduct 
referenced in . . . Bowers . . . are reduced now to 13, of which 4 enforce their laws only against 
homosexual conduct.”). 
11 See, e.g., Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Fighting Sodomy Laws With a Record of 
Success and Decades of Expertise, http://data.lambdalegal.org/pdf/199.pdf (last visited May 1, 2009). 
12 See Kenneth D. Wald et al., The Politics of Gay Rights in American Communities: Explaining 
Antidiscrimination Ordinances and Policies, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1152 (1996) (discussing state and 
municipal politics of gay rights organizations). 
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Obama and the “Democratic sweep” of Congress, state legislatures, and 
gubernatorial elections.   
This Article considers whether the recent election has created a 
“political opportunity”13 for liberal social movements to create substantial 
changes in the legal status of GLBT individuals nationally and locally.  
Currently, debates over same-sex marriage dominate questions of gay and 
lesbian equality.  Recent rulings by the highest courts in California,14 
Connecticut,15 Iowa,16 and Massachusetts17 hold that state laws which 
prohibit same-sex marriage violate those states’ constitutions.  
Californians, however, amended the state constitution to reverse the court’s 
ruling,18 and voters in Florida and Arizona also passed constitutional 
amendments defining marriage in heterosexual terms.19  Although the issue 
of same-sex marriage warrants attention due to the important equal 
protection concerns it presents, in the past, pursuit of this right led to a 
political backlash that ultimately limited GLBT rights.  Currently, 
advocacy for same-sex marriage—though successful in a few “blue” and 
“purple” states—does not present the optimal opportunity for GLBT-social 
movement success in terms of federal court litigation or legislation.  
Nevertheless, the attainment of same-sex marriage in states where the 
political opportunity for marriage equality exists could help reshape the 
landscape of national politics, just as the move to decriminalize sodomy 
altered national politics following Hardwick.  These incremental changes 
could, therefore, support a long-term strategy that seeks to legalize same-
sex marriage as a matter of federal constitutional law.  
This Article takes a moderate or careful position on the prospect of 
progress in the area of GLBT rights and equality, and it encourages GLBT 
social movements to center their advocacy on political issues that present 
                                                                                                                          
13 See DOUG MCADAM, POLITICAL PROCESS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF BLACK INSURGENCY, 
1930–1970 41 (2d ed. 1999) (arguing that “any event or broad social process that serves to undermine 
the calculations and assumptions on which the political establishment is structured occasions a shift in 
political opportunities”); SIDNEY TARROW, POWER IN MOVEMENT 85 (1994) (“By political opportunity 
structure, I mean consistent—but not necessarily formal or permanent—dimensions of the political 
environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their 
expectations for success or failure.”); see also Hutchinson, supra note 1, at 74 (“Political, social, 
economic, and cultural forces shape the potential success or failure of social movement activism. If an 
event or set of events disrupts political institutions and makes them more receptive to the agendas of 
social movements, then a “political opportunity” exists for successful activism.”). 
14 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 452 (Cal. 2008). 
15 Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 482 (Conn. 2008). 
16 Varnum v. Brien, No. 07-1499, 2009 WL 874044, at *29 (Iowa Apr. 3, 2009). 
17 Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003). 
18 Jessica Garrison et al., Election 2008: Gay Marriage; Nation Watches as State Weighs Ban; 
Prop. 8 Battle Drew Money and Attnetion from Across the U.S., L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2008, at A1, 
available at LEXIS, News Library, LAT File. 
19 Jay Hamburg, Florida Bans Same-Sex Marriage, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 6, 2008, at B1, 
available at LEXIS, News Library, ORSENT File; Mary Jo Pitzl, Voters Approve Proposal to Ban Gay 
Marriage, AZCENTRAL.COM, Nov. 5, 2008, available  at http://www.azcentral.com/news/election/ 
azelections/articles/2008/11/05/20081105elect-propositions.html. 
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the greatest opportunities for progress.  This Article proceeds in three 
parts.  Part II examines the relationship between social movement political 
advocacy and litigation and the evolution of the legal status of GLBT 
persons.  Part III argues that while the recent Democratic sweep in the 
United States electoral landscape suggests broad opportunities for liberal 
changes in the legal status of GLBT individuals, social movements should 
resist this idea.  Although several commentators argue that the shifting 
political landscape indicates that a new liberal coalition has emerged in the 
country, this proposition is unsubstantiated and is called into question by 
several factors—including the success of anti-gay initiatives in states that 
voted for Democratic candidates.  Part IV argues that progress on GLBT 
issues will depend upon the presence of a number of political and social 
factors that have historically led to legal and political change, including 
domestic and international political protest, economic concerns, and the 
desire of political elites to gain influence among voters and organized 
sectors of the electorate—including social movements.  Part IV also argues 
that despite the legalization of same-sex marriage through judicial rulings 
and legislation in Iowa, Connecticut, Massachusetts and Vermont, these 
examples cannot serve as models for national action due to the unique 
political conditions in these states.  Marriage equality advocates, however, 
should continue pursuing strategies in states where political opportunities 
for successful advocacy exist.  This local strategy could serve as the basis 
for national change in the future.  Finally, Part IV encourages GLBT social 
movements to consider whether the current decline in the economy 
presents an opportunity for them to challenge inequality with respect to 
important economic benefits and employment. 
II.  SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, SEXUAL ORIENTATION, AND COURT DOCTRINE 
A.  From Bowers to Lawrence: Social Movements Create Change 
Bowers v. Hardwick was the first GLBT rights case decided by the 
Supreme Court.  Bowers held that the constitution does not “confer upon 
homosexuals a right to engage in sodomy.”20  In Bowers, the Court applied 
rational basis review and held that majoritarian notions of morality 
supplied a rational basis for the anti-sodomy statute.21    
Because it only applied rational basis review and narrowly framed the 
liberty interest as “homosexual sodomy”—even though the law itself was 
sex-neutral22—Bowers would later provide support for a broader set of 
                                                                                                                          
20 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190–91 (1986). 
21 Id. at 196. 
22 Thomas Stoddard, Bowers v. Hardwick: Precedent by Personal Predilection, 54 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 648, 651–52 (1987) (“The two courts below dealt with the statute in its entirety; they made no 
distinctions among categories of individuals subject to the prohibition on sodomy. The Supreme Court, 
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laws and policies that discriminated against or denied the liberty of GLBT 
people.  In subsequent equal protection cases, for example, courts held that 
because Bowers permits criminalization of the “conduct that defines the 
class” of “homosexuals,” then gays and lesbians could not qualify as a 
suspect or quasi-suspect class.23   
The tone and substance of Bowers sent GLBT social movement actors 
away from the federal system and to the states.  Social movement actors 
used state courts and legislatures as venues for advocating GLBT rights.24  
They also lobbied for the liberalization of corporate antidiscrimination and 
benefits policies.  These efforts resulted in the development of 
antidiscrimination norms that protect GLBT individuals from 
discrimination and to the reform of policies that had traditionally 
distributed employee benefits based on concepts such as “marriage” that 
inherently discriminate against GLBT individuals.25  The attainment of 
GLBT rights at the state and local level and in the private sector 
augmented the social status of gays and lesbians and helped to create an 
alternative view of constitutional law and sexuality that would later lead to 
the overruling of Bowers.26    
As a result of localized social movement advocacy, when the Court 
                                                                                                                          
however, characterized the case as one concerning ‘the fundamental rights of homosexuals,’ and 
specifically postponed the issue of the statute’s application to ‘other acts of sodomy.’”). 
23 See, e.g., Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“It would be quite anomolous, 
on its face, to declare status defined by conduct that states may constitutionally criminalize as 
deserving of strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause. . . . If the Court was unwilling to object to 
state laws that criminalize the behavior that defines the class, it is hardly open to a lower court to 
conclude that state sponsored discrimination against the class is invidious.  After all, there can hardly 
be more palpable discrimination against a class than making the conduct that defines the class 
criminal.”). 
24 See Wald et al., supra note 12, at 1153–63 (discussing state and local politics of GLBT social 
movements). 
25 See Arthur S. Leonard, The Gay Rights Workplace Revolution, 30 HUM. RTS., Summer 2003, at 
14, 16 (“By the 1990s, the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force was reporting that a substantial 
majority of the largest corporate employers had antidiscrimination policies, and in line with the newest 
thinking some of them were also covering gender identity.”); Jay Michaelson, On Listening to the 
Kulturkampf, Or, How America Overruled Bowers v. Hardwick Even Though Romer v. Evans Didn’t, 
49 DUKE L.J. 1559, 1599 (2000) (“The corporate world has, in the last decade, accorded greater 
recognition to gay family units than ever before; according to a Human Rights Campaign report, at 
least 2,856 private and public employers offered domestic partner health coverage as of August 1999—
compared with about two dozen in 1990.”). 
26 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571–72 (2003), rev’d Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 
(1986) (“In all events we think that our laws and traditions in the past half century are of most 
relevance here.  These references show an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection 
to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.”). 
In our own constitutional system the deficiencies in Bowers became even more 
apparent in the years following its announcement.  The 25 States with laws 
prohibiting the relevant conduct referenced in the Bowers decision are reduced now 
to 13, of which 4 enforce their laws only against homosexual conduct.  In those 
States where sodomy is still proscribed, whether for same-sex or heterosexual 
conduct, there is a pattern of nonenforcement with respect to consenting adults 
acting in private. 
Id. at 573. 
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decided Lawrence v. Texas, the political and legal landscape concerning 
GLBT rights had changed substantially.  For example, while more than 
half of the states criminalized sodomy when the Court decided Bowers, 
only thirteen did so when it issued its ruling in Lawrence.27  Also, only 
four states, including Texas, criminalized same-sex sodomy when the 
Court decided Lawrence.28   
Furthermore, several foreign courts, including the European Court of 
Human Rights, had already invalidated anti-sodomy laws, which indicated 
to the Court that “Western civilization” had reached a new consensus 
regarding the appropriateness of laws that criminalized private adult 
consensual sexual relations.29  In addition, while Lawrence does not 
explicitly rest on this fact, at the time of the ruling, opinion polls indicated 
that a majority of the public opposed the criminalization of adult 
consensual homosexual conduct.30  
These legal and political developments did not go unnoticed by 
members of the Court.  Indeed, the majority opinion makes explicit 
reference to the fundamental changes in the nature of GLBT rights in the 
states and on the international stage that occurred between Bowers and 
Lawrence.31  The opinion also discusses changes in foreign law, which 
sparked a heated retort from Justice Scalia in his dissenting opinion.32    
The strategic choice by pro-gay social movements to pursue GLBT rights 
within state and local governments helped to refashion the legal and 
political landscape regarding sexuality and sexual orientation, which made 
Lawrence a much “safer” ruling than Bowers.   
B.  Lawrence: Cabining Justice 
Although public opinion and the structure of state law on the issue of 
sodomy made Lawrence a safer ruling than Bowers, the Court nevertheless 
cabined its decision in order to limit its reach and to protect the Court’s 
legitimacy from erosion due to a potential conservative political 
backlash.33   The Court, for example, stated that its ruling did not involve a 
claim of a right to legal recognition of GLBT relationships,34 nor did it 
                                                                                                                          
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 See id. (citing Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21 (1981)). 
30 Neil A. Lewis, Conservatives Furious Over Court’s Direction, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2003, at 
A19, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (observing that polls show that majority of 
Americans support legalizing consensual, adult homosexual conduct). 
31 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571–73. 
32 Id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
33 I have analyzed this issue in a prior publication.  See Hutchinson, supra note 1, at 40–58 
(discussing conservative dimensions of Lawrence). 
34 See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567 (arguing that antigay sodomy statutes “seek to control a 
personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty 
of persons to choose without being punished as criminals”); id. at 578 (noting that its ruling “does not 
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involve public sex or prostitution.35  The Court also strained to describe the 
case as involving sex that was potentially part of an “enduring” “personal 
bond”36 between the petitioners (who had actually been involved in a 
casual escapade).  The Court attempted to create “respectable” gay 
“intimacy” by implying an intimate relationship between the parties 
without going far enough to legitimize same-sex marriage and invite 
criticism of its ruling.37   
Predictably, Justice Kennedy, the moderate voice on the Court, 
authored Lawrence (and Romer v. Evans).  As some political scientists 
have argued, public opinion tends to have the “most pronounced” impact 
upon judicial moderates.38   
The Court’s effort to distance Lawrence from same-sex marriage, 
however, was unsuccessful.  After the ruling, public support for same-sex 
marriage decreased dramatically—even though the Court disclaimed the 
notion that Lawrence would lead inevitably to judicial recognition of same-
sex marriage.39 Public support for same-sex marriage fell once again after 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court invalidated the state’s ban on 
same-sex marriage in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, an 
opinion which explicitly cites to Lawrence.40  Conservatives effectively 
used the rulings to mobilize voters against GLBT rights.41  Accurately 
predicting that the cases presented a political opportunity for conservative 
activism, President George W. Bush made same-sex marriage a campaign 
                                                                                                                          
involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual 
persons seek to enter”); id. at 585 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (observing that “other reasons exist to 
promote the institution of marriage beyond mere moral disapproval of an excluded group”). 
35 Id. at 567 (arguing that sodomy laws affect “the most private human conduct . . . in the most 
private of places, the home”); id. at 569 (“Laws prohibiting sodomy do not seem to have been enforced 
against consenting adults acting in private.”); id. at 578 (distinguishing Lawrence from other factual 
settings where states could presumably regulate sexuality, including “public conduct or prostitution”). 
36 Id. at 567 (“When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the 
conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty protected by the 
Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make this choice.”). 
37 Hutchinson, supra note 1, at 44–49. 
38 William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, Public Opinion, the Attitudinal Model and Supreme 
Court Decision Making: A Micro-Analytic Perspective, 58 J. POL. 169, 197 (1996) (observing that “the 
impact of public opinion is most pronounced for the more moderate justices”). 
39 See Adam Liptak, Gay Vows, Repeated from State to State, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2009, at  
WK1, available at LEXIS news library, NYT file (“When the Supreme Court, in Lawrence v. Texas in 
2003, struck down a Texas law making homosexual sex a crime, public support for same-sex 
marriage—a question not directly implicated by the decision—dropped sharply.”). 
40 See id. (“Five months [after Lawrence], the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts issued its 
decision allowing same-sex marriages, causing public support for such marriages to fall further.  It did 
not recover to pre-Lawrence levels until 2005.”). 
41 See Carlos A. Ball, The Backlash Thesis and Same-Sex Marriage: Learning from Brown v. 
Board of Education and Its Aftermath, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1493, 1511 (2006) (“Conservative 
groups reached out to supporters [following Lawrence and Goodridge] with a sense of urgency and 
determination because, as they saw it, the institution of marriage was in great peril.  These groups were 
quite successful in encouraging scores of conservatives across the nation to organize and become 
politically involved on the issue of marriage.”). 
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issue in the 2004 election by proposing a constitutional amendment 
banning same-sex marriage.42  Conservatives introduced similar measures 
in state legislatures.43  Although the federal amendment effort failed, many 
political commentators believe that opposition to same-sex marriage 
caused a surge in voter participation among social conservatives, 
particularly in key swing states where voters considered initiatives banning 
same-sex marriage on Election Day 2004.44  Thus, the backlash to same-
sex marriage could have possibly secured Bush’s reelection.      
In order to avoid setbacks such as the 2004 anti-gay backlash, GLBT 
activists must locate and exploit political opportunities for national and 
local policy reform.  This approach necessarily requires GLBT activists to 
resist assuming that a broadened landscape for change exists merely due to 
the success of Democrats in the 2008 election cycle.  
III.  RED VICTORIES AND BLUE EUPHORIA: AN ELECTION IS NOT A  
SOCIAL MOVEMENT 
A.  Liberal Enthusiasm for Progressive Change 
The Democratic candidates took contradictory stances on questions of 
GLBT rights during the 2008 election.  Because progressives are an 
important base within the Democratic Party, the party’s candidates needed 
to take liberal positions on GLBT rights.  Nevertheless, public opposition 
to same-sex marriage and the successful manipulation of this issue by 
President Bush in 2004 caused Democratic candidates to oppose marriage 
equality, even as they expressed support for other GLBT issues.    
None of the leading Democratic presidential contenders supported the 
legalization of same-sex marriage.45  President Barack Obama stated that 
he opposes same-sex marriage, but that he supports equal “benefits” for 
same-sex couples.46  It appears, however, that Obama may have indeed 
expressed support for same-sex marriage during his 1996 campaign for a 
seat in the Illinois legislature.47   
                                                                                                                          
42 Id. at 1512–13 (discussing President Bush’s support of constitutional prohibition of same-sex 
marriage). 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 1515 (“Furthermore, the conventional wisdom immediately after the election was that 
issues of values and morality in general, and same-sex marriage in particular, played an important role 
in the presidential race, especially in Ohio, the state that ended up deciding the election.”) (citation 
omitted).   
45 Ben Smith, Dem Hopefuls Oppose Same-Sex Marriage, POLITICO, Aug. 10, 2007, 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0807/5320.html. 
46 Perry Bacon Jr., Democratic Candidates Address Gay Rights, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 2007, at 
A7, available at LEXIS news library, WPOST file. 
47 Jason Linkins, Obama Once Supported Same-Sex Marriage ‘Unequivocally’, HUFFINGTON 
POST, Jan. 1, 2003, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/01/13/obama-once-supported-same_n_ 
157656.html. 
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Despite his current opposition to same-sex marriage, Obama has said 
that he opposes efforts within states, such as California’s Proposition 8, to 
define marriage in heterosexual terms.48  Obama also stated during his 
presidential campaign that he opposes and would seek (if elected) the 
repeal of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) and “Don’t Ask, Don’t 
Tell” (DADT).49     
Despite these contradictory positions, GLBT rights groups strongly 
endorsed Democratic candidates.  Democrats generally have much better 
voting records on GLBT equality issues.50  Furthermore, because many 
GLBT individuals support Democrats and because most liberals support 
GLBT rights, GLBT social movements will likely have greater 
opportunities for success if they press Democratic politicians, rather than 
Republicans, for legal change.  
The electoral success of the Democratic candidates—especially 
President Obama—has caused many liberals to embrace the possibility of 
fundamental progressive change.  The Democratic primaries had already 
created the foundation for these arguments.  The progressive Left argued 
that Obama was the preferred candidate who could move the party away 
from “triangulation” and moderate politics.51  Many liberals also believed 
that the election of a black candidate would substantially alter the status of 
United States race relations and even usher in a post-racial society.52   
After Obama defeated McCain, including wins in several southern 
states, many commentators argued that his election marked a fundamental 
shift in the nation’s ideological makeup.  A new “Great Society Coalition” 
of traditionally liberal people of color, educated professionals, women, 
                                                                                                                          
48 John Wildermuth, Obama Opposes Ban on Gay Marriage, S.F. CHRON., July 2, 2008, at A1, 
available at LEXIS news library, SFCHRN file. 
49 See, e.g., Civil Rights, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/civil_rights/ 
(last visited Apr. 21, 2009) (listing Obama’s opposition to “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” and DOMA’s 
unequal distribution of benefits to GLBT versus heterosexual couples).  Recently, however, the 
Department of Justice defended the constitutionality of DOMA, despite Obama’s stated opposition to 
the law.  See http://a.abcnews.go.com/images/Politics/motion_memo_dismiss_filed.pdf. 
50 See HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, CONGRESSIONAL SCORECARD: MEASURING SUPPORT FOR 
EQUALITY IN THE 110TH CONGRESS 4–14, http://www.hrc.org/documents/Congress_Scorecard-
110th.pdf (discussing voting records of Congressional democrats on “gay” issues). 
51 Obama received endorsements from several progressive organizations.  See MoveOn.org, 
MoveOn Endorsement Throw Progreessive Weight Behind Barack Obama, http://moveon.org/press/pr/ 
obamaendorsementrelease.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2009); ProChoiceAmerica.com, NARAL Pro-
Choice America Endorses Sen. Barack Obama, http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/elections/election-
pr/pr_05042008_obamaendorsement.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2009).  Obama also defeated Hillary 
Clinton among “self-described liberal” voters.  See Jennifer Parker, Obama Big Winner in N.C., 
Clinkton Ekes Out Ind. Win, ABC NEWS, May 7, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/ 
Story?id=4802414&page=1 (“Obama has typically fared better among younger voters, people with 
higher-education, self-described liberals, and African Americans.”). 
52 Paul Street, Barack Obama’s White Appeal and the Perverse Racial Politics of the Post-Civil 
Rights Era, DISSIDENT VOICE, June 16, 2007, http://dissidentvoice.org/2007/06/barack-
obama%E2%80%99s-white-appeal-and-the-perverse-racial-politics-of-the-post-civil-rights-era/ 
(arguing that Obama appealed to whites who want to submerge issues of prolonged racial inequality). 
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gays and lesbians, and younger voters would use its electoral power to 
place liberal Democrats in state and national offices and to secure the 
passage of progressive policies that would substantially alter American 
politics.53   
Liberal commentators have also begun to eulogize the Republican 
Party and social conservatism.  Even before Obama’s victory, New York 
Times columnist Frank Rich opined that “the G.O.P. looks more like a 
nostalgic relic than a national political party in contemporary America.  A 
cultural sea change has passed it by.”54  Rich predicted that a “national rout 
in 2008 just may be that Republican Party’s last stand.”55   
Following the election, Jonathan Alter of Newsweek wrote a similarly 
hopeful, but more guarded, column called “We’re Heading Left Once 
Again.”56  Alter asserts that Obama “would have a fighting chance to move 
the country to a new place, or at least one we haven’t seen for a while.  
Leftward ho!”57   
Richard Cohen, a writer for the Washington Post, encouraged liberals 
to “Party Like It’s 1964.”58  Cohen asserted that Bush and McCain have 
“constructed a mean, grumpy, exclusive, narrow-minded and altogether 
retrograde Republican Party.”59  Accordingly, the GOP has earned its fate: 
life in the “political wilderness.”60 
Following the election, New Republic writer John Judis welcomed the 
return of “America the Liberal.”61  Judis argued that:  
The rise of [women, people of color, and professional 
liberals] within the post-industrial economy has brought in its 
wake a new political worldview. Call it “progressive” or 
“liberal” or even “Naderite”. . . . [P]rofessionals are the 
vanguard of the new progressive majority.  Their sensibility 
is reflected in the Democratic platform and increasingly in 
the country as a whole. . . . Professionals are generally liberal 
on civil rights and women’s rights; committed to science and 
                                                                                                                          
53 Phillip Klinkner & Thomas Schaller, LBJ’s Revenge: The 2008 Election and the Rise of the 
Great Society Coalition, 6 FORUM 1, 3–5, 15 (2008), available at http://www.bepress.com/cgi/” 
viewcontent.cgi?article=1269&context=forum. 
54 Frank Rich, The Grand Old White Party Confronts Obama, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/17/opinion/17rich.html?_r=1&th&emc=th. 
55 Id. 
56 Jonathan Alter, We’re Heading Left Once Again, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 18, 2008, 
http://www.newsweek.com/id/164503. 
57 Id. 
58 Richard Cohen, Party Like It’s 1964, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 2008, at A17, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-yn/content/article/2008/10/20/AR2008102002292.html. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 John B. Judis, America the Liberal, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 19, 2008, at 20, available at 
LEXIS, News Library, NEWRPB File. 
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to the separation of church and state; internationalist on trade 
and immigration; skeptical of, but not necessarily opposed to, 
large government programs; and gung-ho about government 
regulation of business, especially K Street lobbyists. 
Many are children of the 1960s and ‘70s—heavily 
influenced by Martin Luther King Jr., Betty Friedan, Gloria 
Steinem, and Nader—but their views are clearly reflected in 
succeeding generations of college-educated Americans, 
particularly the “millennials” who grew up during the 
administrations of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush.  
UCLA’s annual study of incoming college freshmen across 
the country found in 2006 that 28.4 percent identified 
themselves as “liberal”—the highest percentage since 1975.62  
Judis also contends that, while Bush exploited terrorism to implement 
laws and policies that restrained civil liberty, “seven years removed from 
September 11, liberal views have re-emerged with a vengeance.  Now, the 
coming recession seems likely to push voters even further left.”63   
B.  Warning Signs: Kinks in the Narrative of Liberal Dominance 
Several kinks immediately emerged in the political landscape that 
would test the enthusiasm among progressives concerning the prospect for 
change.  First, on the night of Obama’s victory, California passed 
Proposition 8, a constitutional amendment that reverses a ruling of the 
California Supreme Court which invalidated the state’s prohibition of 
same-sex marriage.64  Although Obama won the state by more than twenty 
percentage points, the largest margin of any candidate since World War 
II,65 Proposition 8 garnered support from a slight majority of voters.  The 
conservative measure also performed comfortably within black and Latino 
communities,66 whose support for Obama greatly exceeded his support 
among other voters in the state.67   
Also, the presidential election returns revealed that Obama failed to 
                                                                                                                          
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 See, e.g, Garrison et al., supra note 18. 
65 Justin Ewers, Obama Wins by Historic Margin in California, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 
5, 2008, available at http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/campaign-2008/2008/11/05/obama-wins-
by-historic-margin-in-california.html. 
66 See http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/results/polls/#val=CAI01p1 (listing exit polling 
showing support for Proposition 8 among African-American voters at 70% and among Latino voters at 
53%). 
67 See http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/results/polls/#val=CAP00p1 (listing exit showing 
support in California for Barack Obama among African-American voters at 94% and among Latino 
voters at 74%). 
 1536 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1523 
win a majority of white votes nationally,68 repeating an unbroken trend for 
Democratic presidential contenders that began after the 1964 election (and 
the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).69  Obama also failed to win 
a majority of white votes in eleven “blue states,” and he only won a slight 
majority of white votes in five other blue states, including California, 
Connecticut, and his home state of Illinois.70  Furthermore, black and 
Latino voters fueled Obama’s victory in key states that other Democrats 
had lost in recent elections, including Nevada, New Mexico, Ohio, Florida, 
Virginia, Indiana and North Carolina.71  McCain, by contrast, received 
votes primarily from whites and men, and more specifically from white 
men.72  Thus, rather than proving the liberal idea that the United States has 
transcended race, voter behavior in the 2008 presidential election suggests 
that racial and gender cleavages remain important elements of the nation’s 
political and social culture.    
C.  Split Ticket: GLBT Rights and the New Democratic Dominance 
The passage of Proposition 8 caused an immediate rift in liberal 
celebrations of Obama’s election victory.  Many supporters of same-sex 
marriage protested the passage of Proposition 8 and criticized blacks, 
Latinos, and white religious voters who supported the measure.73  These 
divisions, however, predated the passage of Proposition 8.  
Even many pro-GLBT advocates remain conflicted over same-sex 
marriage.  The marriage equality movement, as several critics have 
observed, suffers because it privileges nuclear family arrangements, 
accepts the problematic conditioning of important social resources (like 
health care) upon marriage, marginalizes the poor and people of color by 
                                                                                                                          
68 See http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/results/polls/#val=USP00p1 (listing exit showing 
support for Barack Obama among White voters nationwide at 43%.). 
69 David Paul Kuhn, Polls: White Support for Obama at Historic Level, POLITICO.COM, Oct. 24, 
2008, available at LEXIS, Newsfile POLTCO. 
70 See http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/results/polls/ (exit polling showing support for 
Barack Obama among White voters at 52% in CA, 51% in CT, IA, IL, and MI, 50% in CO, 49% in NJ, 
48% in PA, 47% in MD, 46% in OH, 45% in IN and NV, 42% in FL and NM, 39% in VA, and 35% in 
NC). 
71 See id. (exit polling showing support for Barack Obama among African-American and Latino 
voters, respectively, at 94% and 76% in NV, N/A and 69% in NM, 97% and N/A in OH, 96% and 57% 
in FL, 92% and 65% in VA90% and 77% in IN, and 95% and N/A in NC). 
72 See http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/results/polls/#USP00p1 (exit polling showing 
support for John McCain at 57% amoung White Men voters). 
73 See Wyatt Buchanan, Gays See Chance for Progress; ELECTION 2008/The Battle Over Same-
Sex Marriage; Participants in Anti-Prop. 8 Movement Hope to Turn Protests into Wider Push for 
Equality, SAN FRAN. CHRON., Nov. 15, 2008, at A1 (desribing efforts to organize nationwide protests 
over Proposition 8); Jessica Garrison & Joanna Lin, Mormons’ Prop. 8 Protested; Gay-rights Activists 
Criticize the Church for Its Role in Helping to Pass California’s Ban on Same-sex Marriage, L.A. 
TIMES, Nov. 7, 2008, at B1 (reporting protests targeting Mormons in California); Karl Vick & Ashley 
Surdin, Most of California’s Black Voters Backed Gay Marriage Ban; 53% of Latinos Also Supported 
Proposition 8, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 2008, at A03 (analyzing support for Proposition 8 among black 
and Latino communities). 
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advocating marital households as the most desirable settings for 
childrearing, and stigmatizes gay male sexuality by describing marital sex 
as optimal and suggesting that marriage could harness gay men’s sexual 
passions and “civilize” them.74  Despite these important concerns, marriage 
equality remains fundamentally an argument about the inappropriateness of 
state action that sanctions, facilitates or manifests heterosexism.  The 
prohibition of same-sex marriage rests on pernicious stereotypes of GLBT 
individuals and upon the privileging of heterosexuality.75  As such, despite 
the limitations and problems of the same-sex marriage movement, the 
attainment of marital equality represents a valid—yet often overvalued—
dimension of GLBT social movements. 
Recent opinion polls, however, demonstrate that nearly 70% of the 
nation opposes the legalization of same-sex marriage.76  Moreover, the 
passage of Proposition 8 demonstrates that this opposition extends to even 
the bluest jurisdictions—not only to deeply conservative areas of the 
country.  Many political commentators—and perhaps GLBT social 
movement actors themselves—failed to appreciate the ideological diversity 
of Democratic voters.  Their lack of understanding of this issue prevented 
them from engaging in the specialized activism and outreach that could 
have potentially diminished support for the discriminatory constitutional 
amendment among persons of color.77  
The United States electorate holds diverse political viewpoints.  Even 
voters who traditionally favor one political party or candidate over another 
do not necessarily share the same positions on substantive issues, and even 
if they reach similar positions they may do so for different reasons.  Blacks 
and Latinos tend to support Democratic candidates because of the party’s 
stronger support for civil rights and economic justice relative to the 
Republican Party, but these groups often endorse socially conservative 
positions on issues such as abortion and GLBT rights.78  The influence of 
                                                                                                                          
74 See Hutchinson, supra note 1, at 46–49 (discussing conservative views of same-sex marriage). 
75 See, e.g., Nancy E. Dowd, Masculinities and Feminist Legal Theory, 23 WIS. J.L. GENDER & 
SOC’Y 201, 240 (2008) (“[O]ur stereotypes and homophobia have typically resisted the notion of gay 
men as partners and parents. This is evident in the resistance to gay marriage and gay adoption.”); 
Justin T. Wilson, Preservationism, Or the Elephant in the Room: How Opponents of Same-Sex 
Marriage Deceive Us into Establishing Religion, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 561, 678 (2007) 
(“[D]enying same-sex couples access to a genuinely secular definition of civil marriage perpetuates 
bigotry and homophobia at a tangible cost to these couples and their families.”). 
76 See Press Release, CBS News Poll, The Public’s Views on Same-Sex Marriage (June 15, 2008) 
(stating thirty percent of polled Americans favor same-sex marriage). 
77 Some proponents of Proposition 8 made explicit appeals to black voters.  CBS Evening News, 
Gay Marriage Opponents “Thank” Obama, CBSNEWS.COM, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/ 
2008/10/05/eveningnews/main4502738.shtml. 
78 Maxine Burkett, Strategic Voting and African-Americans: True Vote, True Representation, 
True Power for the Black Community, 8 MICH. J. RACE & L. 425, 457 (2003) (“Though many Blacks 
have a tendency toward social conservatism,  that is, with respect to issues outside of social justice and 
civil rights . . . their resistance to the Republican Party remains a ‘curious historical anomaly.’”); Kim 
Geron & James S. Lai, Beyond Symbolic Representation: A Comparison of the Electoral Pathways and 
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religion in black and Latino communities explains these groups’ embrace 
of social conservatism.  Nevertheless, many blacks and Latinos 
compromise their views on socially conservative issues in order to endorse 
Democratic candidates.  By contrast, white evangelicals tend to prioritize 
socially conservative issues in their electoral decisions, which explains 
their support for Republican candidates, despite the GOP’s general 
opposition to progressive class and labor policies that could benefit poor 
whites.79 
The inclusion of Proposition 8 on the California ballot did not require 
blacks and Latinos to engage in political compromise: They could vote for 
Obama and vote to ban same-sex marriage.  And they did so in great 
numbers.  Up to 70% of black voters and 53% of Latino voters supported 
Proposition 8,80 while over 94% and 74% of these groups voted for 
Obama, respectively.81  Although some surveys show much smaller black 
support for Proposition 8,82 the two groups nevertheless “split” their tickets 
by endorsing the “liberal” candidate while embracing the conservative 
position on same-sex marriage. 
Although many persons within the GLBT community responded to 
these statistics by condemning black and Latino voters, their anger was 
somewhat misplaced.  First, singling out blacks and Latinos obscures the 
broader support for the measure across racial groups.  Second, the racial 
narrative fails to appreciate the importance of religion in shaping support 
for the measure.  Religiosity—not race—was the strongest factor that 
determined whether or not a voter supported the measure, and black and 
Latino support for Proposition 8 turned primarily on religiosity.83 
                                                                                                                          
Policy Priorities of Asian American and Latino Elected Officials, 9 ASIAN L.J. 41, 57 (2002) (“In the 
general population, Latinos identified themselves as predominantly moderate to conservative. . . . This 
apparent difference between the leaders and the led may not be as great as it appears at first glance 
because most Latinos self-identify themselves as socially conservative, but support a liberal social 
agenda.”). 
79 See Mark Silk, Defining Religious Pluralism in America: A Regional Analysis, 612 ANNALS 
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 64, 74 (2007) (“Over the next quarter century [following 1980], white 
evangelicals moved decisively into the Republican camp and became the source of the party’s activist 
core. Parachurch organizations like the Moral Majority and Christian Coalition and evangelical 
churches themselves emerged as important agents of political mobilization for the GOP—comparable 
across the Bible Belt to the role organized labor has played for the Democratic party in the industrial 
heartland since the 1930s.”). 
80 Vick & Surdin, supra note 73. 
81 Election Center 2008, http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/results/polls/#val=CAP00p1 (last 
visited Apr. 17, 2009). 
82 PATRICK J. EGAN & KENNETH SHERILL, NAT’L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, CALIFORNIA’S 
PROPOSITION 8: WHAT HAPPENED, AND WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD? 2 (2008). 
83 See Id. (arguing that “black support for Proposition 8 can largely be explained by African 
Americans’ higher levels of religiosity—a characteristic strongly associated with opposition to same-
sex marriage”); id. at 6 (“The analysis shows that African Americans and Latinos were stronger 
supporters of Proposition 8 than other groups . . . but not to a significant degree after controlling for 
religiosity. . . . That is, much of the stronger support found for Proposition 8 among these groups is 
explained by their increased levels of attendance of religious services.”). 
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Nevertheless, race is not entirely irrelevant to the analysis.  Pro-GLBT 
and antiracist groups suffer from strained relations, despite the fact that 
both groups could benefit from the strengthening of antidiscrimination law 
and policy.84  Culturally, homophobia within communities of color and 
racism among white GLBT people account for much of the conflict.  Also, 
many persons of color believe that despite the historical progress on 
questions of civil rights, the law has not eliminated structural causes of 
inequality.85  Blacks fear that including other categories of protection in 
civil rights law will diminish attention paid to their vulnerable status.   
By contrast, GLBT advocates often invoke racial analogies to argue 
that gays and lesbians should receive the same civil rights protection that 
blacks and other persons of color already enjoy.  The analogy represents a 
legitimate effort to generate empathy for victims of homophobia and to 
navigate a legal culture that favors arguments rooted in precedent.  This 
approach, however, fuels conflict between the two groups because people 
of color disagree with the implication that the law already sufficiently 
protects them from discrimination and inequality, and their own 
stereotypes of GLBT people causes them vehemently to resist   
comparisons of heterosexism and racism.86  
D.  Obama’s Big Tent: Rick Warren and GLBT Rights 
The discontent among GLBT individuals over the success of 
Proposition 8 increased after Obama selected conservative minister Rick 
Warren to deliver the invocation at his inauguration.87  Warren is a best-
selling author of The Purpose Driven Life and the minister at the 
Saddleback Church in Lake Forest, California.88  He is a popular 
evangelical with a reputation for embracing humanitarian causes, but who, 
nevertheless, holds clearly conservative positions on social issues.89  
Warren campaigned in favor of California Proposition 8—although he 
recently denied doing so.90  Prior to the passage of Proposition 8, Warren 
stated during an interview that in addition to opposing same-sex marriage, 
he does not support incestuous marriage, marriages between adults and 
                                                                                                                          
84 See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Identity Crisis: “Intersectionality,” “Multidimensionality,” 
and the Development of an Adequate Theory of Subordination, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 285, 295–98 
(2001) (discussing the problems that arise from tension between antiracist and GLBT social 
movements). 
85 Id. at 293. 
86 Id. at 293 n.37. 
87 Alexander Mooney, Obama’s Inaugural Choice Sparks Outrage, CNN.COM, Dec. 18, 2008, 
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88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Julia Duin, Warren Waver on Prop 8 Stuns Leaders, WASHINGTONTIMES.COM, Apr. 11, 2009, 
http://washingtontimes.com/news/2009/apr/11/warren-waver-stuns-leaders/.  
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children, and polygamy.91  He later said that he views all of these 
“relationships,” including same-sex marriage, as moral equivalents.92 
The Human Rights Campaign, the nation’s largest advocate for GLBT 
rights, sent an “Open Letter” to Obama, criticizing him for inviting Warren 
to speak at the inauguration.93  In the face of a growing political furor, 
Obama issued a public statement defending his invitation to Warren.  
Obama said that including Warren in the inauguration would bolster his 
effort to reach across the aisle and include all voices at the table: 
I’ve . . . said . . . that it is important for America to come 
together, even though we may have disagreements on certain 
social issues. . . . [W]e’re not going to agree on every single 
issue, but what we have to do is to be able to create an 
atmosphere . . . where we can disagree without being 
disagreeable and then focus on those things that we hold in 
common as Americans. 
During the course of the entire inaugural festivities, there 
are going to be a wide range of viewpoints that are presented.  
And that’s how it should be, because that’s what America’s 
about.  That’s part of the magic of this country, is that we are 
diverse and noisy and opinionated.94 
Obama’s explanation for selecting Warren obscures the fact that the 
vast majority of the public—including Obama himself—opposes the 
legalization of same-sex marriage.  A CBS poll released in June 2008 finds 
that only 30% of Americans favor legal recognition of same-sex 
marriage.95  Another 28% favor “civil unions,” while 36% oppose any 
legal recognition of same-sex intimate relationships.96  The poll shows the 
greatest level of support for same-sex marriage since 2004 when CBS 
began surveying public opinion on this issue.97  The paltry number of 
Americans who endorse same-sex marriage actually represents an 
improvement over the recent past. 
Public opinion on this subject varies slightly with political party 
                                                                                                                          
91 Beliefnet.Com, Video Interview with Rick Warren, available at http://www.beliefnet.com/ 
Video/Beliefnet-Interviews/Rick-Warren/Rick-Warren-Interview-On-Gay-Marriage-And-
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93 Joe Solmonese, President, Human Rights Campaign, Letter to Pres-Elect Obama on Choice of 
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95 CBS NEWS, THE PUBLIC’S VIEWS ON SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (2008), available at 
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affiliation, but strong majorities of both major parties oppose same-sex 
marriage.  The poll finds that only 36% of Democrats and 14% of 
Republicans support the legalization of same-sex marriage.98  Similarly, 
only 34% of independent voters support same-sex marriage.99  Other major 
polling data confirm these results. 
Given the nature of public opinion, no major presidential candidate 
endorsed the legalization of same-sex marriage.100  Democrats Barack 
Obama, Hillary Clinton, John Edwards, Joe Biden, and Bill Richardson101 
and Republicans Rudolph Giuliani, Fred Thompson, Mitt Romney,102 John 
McCain, Mike Huckabee,103 and Ron Paul104 all opposed same-sex 
marriage during their presidential campaigns.  Advocates of Proposition 8 
made computerized calls to black voters that broadcast Obama’s public 
statements expressing his personal opposition to same-sex marriage 
(despite his opposition to Proposition 8).105 
Because Obama, Warren, and the vast majority of Americans oppose 
the legalization of same-sex marriage, Warren’s participation in the 
inauguration did not augment the diversity of political viewpoints.  Instead, 
Warren’s presence allowed Obama to portray himself as either a moderate 
or “agreeable” progressive so that he could maximize political support for 
his policies and reelection bid.  Although this is a smart political strategy 
for President Obama, it leaves open the question of the extent to which this 
approach will shape actual policy on GLBT rights.  Furthermore, if Obama 
has accurately read the political pulse of the nation in deciding to pick an 
anti-gay speaker for his inauguration, then GLBT social movements must 
consider what role, if any, marriage politics can play in national equality 
debates.  The Warren controversy likely reveals that national politicians 
can safely oppose same-sex marriage, even if some local politicians 
cannot. 
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100 See Smith, supra note 45 (claiming that “[t]he leading Democratic presidential candidates all 
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IV.  SOCIAL MOVEMENT ACTIVISM IN AN OBAMA ERA 
A.  The Success of Same-Sex Marriage in Liberal Jurisdictions Should Not 
Dictate Nationwide Political Activity 
Because most of the public disapproves of same-sex marriage, GLBT 
equality movements must carefully consider when and where to press for 
reform.  Presently, pro-GLBT activists have pursued a smart strategy that 
seeks judicial or legislative recognition of same-sex marriage in liberal 
states that already have substantial laws and policies that prohibit 
discrimination against GLBT individuals.   
The achievement of same-sex marriage in Connecticut and other 
liberal states, however, will not necessarily lead to similar rulings in 
federal courts and in states that do not have established legal traditions 
protecting GLBT individuals from discrimination.  Although national 
opinion polls demonstrate that the public strongly disfavors same-sex 
marriage, in Connecticut, a slight majority of the public supports same-sex 
marriage.106  The divided Kerrigan decision mirrors the closely divided 
political opinion on the subject within the state.  And while Governor Jodi 
Rell initially aligned with Republicans and opposed same-sex marriage, 
she has publicly stated that she does not oppose the Kerrigan decision and 
that she will not launch an effort to reverse the ruling by constitutional 
amendment.107   
The GLBT political strategy of keeping marriage equality litigation 
and legislation within the state system mirrors the successful approach that 
social movements pursued after the Bowers decision.  By engaging in 
political action that substantially altered the legal status of GLBT people 
and public opinion on gay rights issues across the nation, GLBT social 
movements created a political opportunity for the Supreme Court to 
invalidate sodomy laws in Lawrence.108  The pursuit of same-sex marriage 
in state and local politics could ultimately result in federal recognition of 
marriage equality.  Given the substantial public opposition to the legal 
recognition of same-sex marriage, however, GLBT social movement actors 
should continue advancing this particular equality concern primarily within 
state and local political and judicial venues. 
 
                                                                                                                          
106 See Connecticut Voters Back Same-Sex Marriage, Quinnipiac University Poll Finds; Rell 
Approval Holds As Dodd, Lieberman Scores Drop, QUINNIPIAC UNIV., Dec. 17, 2008, 
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abide by the state supreme court’s decision).   
108 See supra text accompanying note 24.   
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B.  National Political Opportunities 
Since Obama’s inauguration, GLBT social movements have also 
pursued a sophisticated federal or national strategy that involves placing 
pressure on President Obama to embrace GLBT equality and to seek 
judicial relief in areas where public opinion would likely support court 
rulings that favor GLBT litigants.  Specifically, GLBT social movement 
actors have attempted to highlight the unequal distribution of federal 
benefits and employment, and they have largely avoided efforts to legalize 
same-sex marriage as a matter of federal law or court doctrine. 
For example, Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders (GLAD), the 
organization that litigated Goodridge, has filed a federal lawsuit on behalf 
of 15 gay and lesbian individuals from Massachusetts.109  The litigation 
challenges the constitutionality of DOMA.110  All of the plaintiffs became 
legally married in Massachusetts following Goodridge.  DOMA however, 
defines “marriage” in heterosexual terms for purposes of federal law.111  
Consequently, same-sex married partners do not qualify for federal 
benefits or rights that normally attach to marriage.  Accordingly, same-sex 
married partners cannot jointly file federal taxes, do not qualify for 
survivor benefits under social security or federal pensions, cannot include a 
spouse in a health plan for federal workers, and do not qualify for many 
other federal rights and privileges reserved for married individuals.  
Although many of these benefits should not rest exclusively—if at all—on 
marriage, DOMA explicitly discriminates against “married” GLBT 
individuals and therefore presents serious constitutional questions. 
The Massachusetts plaintiffs seek only to invalidate DOMA’s 
restriction of federal benefits to opposite-sex couples.112  They have not 
asked the court to rule that prohibiting same-sex marriage violates the 
Constitution.113  The fact that the case does not seek “marriage” rights, but 
only federal benefits, could make it politically “safe.”  Because the vast 
majority of the public disagrees with the legalization of same-sex marriage, 
it is unlikely that a court—especially the conservative Supreme Court—
would issue a ruling striking down laws that prohibit same-sex marriage.114 
The litigation also implicates economic rights and benefits, which 
could enjoy wider public support due to the severe economic downturn.  
                                                                                                                          
109 Jonathan Saltzman, Same-Sex Spouses Challenge US Curbs, BOSTON.COM, Mar. 3, 2009, 
http://www.boston.com/news/local/breaking_news/2009/03/samesex_spouses.html?p1=Well_MostPop
_Emailed4.   
110  Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 
1738C (2000) (prohibiting same-sex marriage) and 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) (defining “marriage”)). 
111  1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) (“[T]he word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man and 
one woman as husband and wife . . . .”). 
112 Saltzman, supra note 109. 
113 Id. 
114 See supra Part II (discussing congruence of court rulings and public opinion). 
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The 2008 elections turned in large part on the negative performance of the 
economy under the stewardship of President Bush.115  GLAD carefully 
chose plaintiffs whose experiences, as stated in a press release, could 
appeal to public vulnerability during the current economic crisis.  The 
plaintiffs include: 
Nancy Gill (51) and Marcelle Letourneau (47) of 
Bridgewater:  Nancy has been a postal worker for more than 
21 years, but as a federal employee she is unable to provide 
for Marcelle the health benefits that her co-workers’ spouses 
readily receive.   Nancy and Marcelle have 2 children. . . . 
Melba Abreu (53) and Beatrice Hernandez (47) of 
Boston: Both Cuban-Americans, they are unable to file 
federal tax returns jointly and lose thousands of dollars each 
year.  Because of that inequity, their dream of owning their 
own business has been deferred. . . . 
Herbert Burtis (78) of Sandisfield:  Herb, a 78-year-old 
musician and teacher, lost his spouse after 60 years together, 
including the last 13 when John battled Parkinson’s disease.   
Herb’s already limited income is severely reduced because he 
is denied the $700 month that would come with Social 
Security survivor benefits. . . . 
Randell Lewis-Kendell (52) of Harwich Port:  Randy 
lost Rob, his spouse and partner of 30 years, to cancer in 
2007.   A shopkeeper on Cape Cod, Randy struggled to pay 
for Rob’s funeral expenses because the federal government 
denied him the $255 benefit it provides all other bereaved 
spouses.   When Randy turns 60, he will not be eligible for 
Rob’s higher Social Security benefit. . . .116 
Another interesting political dimension of the anti-DOMA litigation 
concerns President Obama, whose position on the subject has been 
somewhat inconsistent.  During his campaign for Senate in 2004, Obama 
wrote a letter to the Windy City Times—a GLBT-themed newspaper in 
Chicago—that takes a firm stance supporting gay rights issues.  In the 
letter, Obama says he has always opposed DOMA, and he promises to vote 
to repeal the statute if elected: 
For the record, I opposed DOMA [the Defense of 
                                                                                                                          
115 Barbara Bradley Hagerty, Exit Polls Link Obama Victory to Economic Fears, NPR.ORG, Nov. 
4, 2008, available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=96599102. 
116 Press Release, Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders, GLAD Files Lawsuit Challenging 
Denial of Critical Federal Benefits to Married Same-Sex Couples (Mar. 3, 2009), available at 
http://www.glad.org/uploads/docs/press-releases/2009-03-03-DOMA.pdf. 
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Marriage Act] in 1996.  It should be repealed and I will vote 
for its repeal on the Senate floor.  I will also oppose any 
proposal to amend the U.S. Constitution to ban gays and 
lesbians from marrying.  This is an effort to demonize people 
for political advantage, and should be resisted. . . .117 
Although the 2004 letter states that Obama opposed the enactment of 
DOMA in 1996 and that he would vote to repeal it, a few months earlier in 
2003, Obama completed a candidate’s questionnaire in which he stated that 
he did not support the repeal of DOMA.118  In 2007, Bill Burton, a 
campaign spokesperson, tried to explain the shift, saying that “after hearing 
from gay friends who relayed to Obama how hurtful it was for the bill to 
be law, Obama supported its repeal.”119  But this does not explain how he 
could oppose DOMA in 1996, support it in 2003, and oppose it in 2004. 
During his presidential campaign, Obama took a position favoring the 
“complete repeal” of DOMA, including the clause that purports to 
authorize states to deny full faith and credit to same-sex marriages valid 
under the laws in other states.120  But in 2004, he stated that the full faith 
and credit clause does not require a state to honor out-of-state marriages 
that its own law prohibits.121   
As for his current position, the WhiteHouse.Gov website contains the 
following language regarding DOMA: 
Obama also believes we need to repeal the Defense of 
Marriage Act and enact legislation that would ensure that the 
1,100+ federal legal rights and benefits currently provided on 
the basis of marital status are extended to same-sex couples 
in civil unions and other legally-recognized unions.  These 
rights and benefits include the right to assist a loved one in 
times of emergency, the right to equal health insurance and 
other employment benefits, and property rights.122  
This position, which supports the equal provision of federal benefits to 
                                                                                                                          
117 Letters: Obama on Marriage; Gay Games, WINDY CITY TIMES, Feb. 11, 2004, available at 
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same-sex and opposite-sex married couples, is precisely the litigants’ 
argument in the Massachusetts lawsuit.  Accordingly, the case could test 
Obama’s position on the subject.  If Obama believes that DOMA is 
abhorrent and that it should be repealed, then presumably he could direct 
Attorney General Holder to seek a resolution of the case (such as a stay or 
settlement) while he works with Congress to repeal the statute. 
GLBT social movements could also seek the implementation of 
employment protections, such as the Employment Nondiscrimination Act 
(EDNA)123 and the repeal of DADT—the controversial policy that 
prohibits openly gay and lesbian individuals from serving in the military.124  
President Obama has already expressed opposition to DADT, and he also 
supports ENDA.125  Social movement activity that focuses on employment 
discrimination during a time of high unemployment might generate greater 
public support.   
V.  CONCLUSION  
The Kerrigan decision, along with court rulings in Massachusetts and 
Iowa and legislation in New Hampshire and Vermont, indicates evolution 
on the issue of GLBT equality.  GLBT social movements have pursued an 
effective strategy that seeks judicial and legislative recognition of same-
sex marriage in liberal states in order to reshape the legal and political 
landscape of GLBT rights prior to advocating the issue in federal courts or 
in Congress.126  This is the same legal strategy that social movements 
employed in order to alter the legal status of GLBT persons after the 
Bowers decision.  This strategy played a large role in the Supreme Court’s 
eventual invalidation of sodomy laws. 
Connecticut is not a “bellwether” state on the subject of same-sex 
marriage.  Unless liberal social movements carefully choose what issues to 
pursue in national politics and which ones to advocate in state and local 
jurisdictions, they could provoke a massive political backlash against 
GLBT rights.  Given the strong public opposition to same-sex marriage, 
this issue seems appropriately pursued in state courts and legislatures.  But 
the widespread public vulnerability due to the current economic crisis 
might present political opportunities for GLBT social movements to press 
                                                                                                                          
123 Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2007, H.R. 2015, 110th Cong. (2007) (proposing a 
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issues that are more pointedly linked to economic health and which do not 
as easily provoke moralistic and religious opposition.  Social movement 
activity that highlights employment discrimination and denial of important 
federal benefits, for example, might engender greater public support for 
GLBT equality during a time of great economic distress.  Litigation that 
challenges DOMA’s denial of federal benefits to legally married same-sex 
couples places the issue of GLBT economic vulnerability in public 
discourse. 
Finally, GLBT social movement actors must resist believing that the 
success of Democratic politicians will necessarily translate into “victories” 
for GLBT causes.  The passage of Proposition 8 despite Obama’s historic 
victory in California demonstrates that Democratic voters take complicated 
positions (like all other voters) and that they can embrace social 
conservatism and vote for liberal candidates.  The controversy surrounding 
Rick Warren demonstrates that Democratic politicians will cater to 
moderate or even conservative interests if doing so could benefit them 
politically.  The Obama administration’s recent decision to defend the 
constitutionality of DOMA also demonstrates that political calculations 
will continue to lead “liberal” politicians to embrace conservative 
positions.  Social conservatism and triangulation among Democrats can 
lead to conflict and political losses, but social movment strategies that take 
into account the complex political choices of voters and politicians could 
help to diminish or prevent such setbacks in the future. 
 
 
